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Abstract: An influential argument due to Elliott Sober, subsequently strengthened 
by Denis Walsh and Joel Pust, moves from plausible premises to the bold conclusion 
that natural selection cannot explain the traits of individual organisms. If the 
argument were sound, the explanatory scope of selection would depend, surprisingly, 
on metaphysical considerations concerning origin essentialism. I show that the 
Sober-Walsh-Pust argument rests on a flawed counterfactual criterion for 
explanatory relevance. I further show that a more defensible criterion for explanatory 
relevance recently proposed by Michael Strevens lends support to the view that 
natural selection can be relevant to the explanation of individual traits.   
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1. The Negative View as a Problem 
Can natural selection help explain why a particular organism has the traits it does? On the positive 
view of natural selection, it can: past selection for some trait can help explain why a later individual 
instantiates that trait. On the negative view of natural selection, it cannot: selection can explain the 
distribution and origin of trait types in a population, but it cannot explain the possession of any 
particular trait token by any particular individual.  
 
The debate is more than a matter of idle curiosity.1 The negative view, if correct, has serious 
implications, of which perhaps the most troubling is that it threatens to render inexplicable the 
adaptedness of an individual organism.2 While an organism’s first-order traits admit of proximate 
explanations in terms of their developmental history, an individual’s adaptedness does not: one 
could know everything about the proximate causal processes by which an organism comes to 
develop a particular set of traits, and yet still lack an explanation for the good fit between those 
traits and the environment in which the organism lives. One could know everything about how a 
chameleon builds its long, sticky tongue and sharp, grippy claws and yet still be amazed when the 
chameleon crawls out of its egg, scales a tree and zaps a nearby insect. Why is it so well adapted to 
its environment? Purely developmental explanations seem to fall short here. Yet, if the Negative 
View is correct, there can be no evolutionary explanation of this phenomenon either, since the 
 
1 To track the contours of the debate, see Ayala 1970; Cummins 1975; Wright 1976; Nagel 1977; Lewontin 1983; Sober 
1984, 1995; Neander 1988, 1995a,b; Dretske 1988; Walsh 1998; Matthen 1999, 2002, 2003; Lewens 2001; Pust 2001, 
2004; Forber 2005; Nanay 2005, 2010; Stegmann 2010a, b. 
2 Note that, on the Negative View, selection may still explain why adaptations, construed as trait types, arise in a 
population; it merely fails to explain, for any particular individual, why that individual has the adaptation (see Walsh 
1998, Lewens 2009). 
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phenomenon amounts to the instantiation of a particular trait (viz. adaptedness) by a particular 
individual. We seem to be left with no explanation at all.3 
 
The aim of this paper is reassurance. We owe the most influential argument for the negative 
view to Sober (1995), though Walsh (1998) and Pust (2002, 2004) have subsequently strengthened 
Sober’s case in significant respects. Here I show that the Sober-Walsh-Pust (SWP) argument rests 
on a flawed criterion for explanatory relevance. I then show that a more defensible criterion for 
explanatory relevance vindicates the positive view. In particular, I show that natural selection is 
likely to be relevant in explaining the adaptedness of an individual organism.  
 
2. The Sober-Walsh-Pust Argument 
To understand the structure of the SWP argument, we first need to consider how a simple argument 
for the positive view fails. Consider some organism O with some arbitrary trait T inherited from its 
ancestors. These ancestors enjoyed a selective advantage in virtue of possessing T. Does natural 
selection thereby help explain why O has T? Consider the following line of reasoning: 
 
(1) Past natural selection for T helps explain why O’s ancestors 
reproduced successfully. 
(2) Anything that helps explain why O’s ancestors reproduced 
successfully thereby helps explain why O exists. 
 
3 Walsh (2003, 2006) suggests that an appeal to developmental plasticity (see West-Eberhard 2003) may do the 
necessary explanatory work. I remain sceptical: plasticity may explain some adaptive phenotypes, but can hardly 
explain, for instance, why a chameleon is so adept at fly-catching when a no-less-plastic human baby, left to develop in 
the same environment, would not be. 
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(3) Anything that helps explain why O exists thereby helps explain 
why O has T.  
(4) (from 1, 2, 3) Past natural selection for T helps explain why O has 
T. 
 
The simple argument is plainly valid. If it is sound, the positive view is vindicated. Premise 
(1) seems plausible, while (2) and (3) appear to be grounded in the causal continuity of the processes 
involved: the reproductive success of O’s ancestors led to O’s conception, O’s conception initiated 
its development, and O’s development produced its phenotype. Yet it is easy enough to see that 
something must be wrong, for suppose that O’s ancestors also enjoyed a selective advantage in 
virtue of possessing another arbitrary trait, X, which O does not possess and which is functionally 
unrelated to T. Now consider the following parallel argument: 
 
(5) Past natural selection for X helps explain why O’s ancestors 
reproduced successfully. 
(6) Anything which helps explain why O’s ancestors reproduced 
successfully thereby helps explain why O exists. 
(7) Anything which helps explain why O exists thereby helps explain 
why O has T.  
(8) (from 5, 6, 7) Past natural selection for X helps explain why O has 
T. 
 
The only difference between these arguments is the substitution of arbitrary trait X for 
arbitrary trait T. Yet the second argument implies that we can explain the current traits of individuals 
by citing past selection for completely different traits: to explain why I have an opposable thumb, I 
can point out that my ancestors enjoyed a selective advantage by virtue of possessing an appendix! 
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This information should be irrelevant, and the culprit is (3): it is not true that anything which helps 
explain why O exists also helps explain why O has T. As Sober (1995) notes, the implicitly 
contrastive nature of the explanandum shows how such a situation can arise: 
 
The fact that I have a sweet tooth explains why I order dessert in the 
restaurant, and why the waiter places a dessert before me. However, 
my taste for sweets does not help explain why I find myself facing a 
slice of cake rather than a dish of ice cream. The contrastive character 
of explanation shows how selection can explain the existence and 
number of offspring, without thereby helping to explain why those 
offspring have the traits they do. (Sober 1995, 388) 
 
The simple argument for the positive view fails because, when we ask why some individual has the 
traits it does, we are asking not why O has T simpliciter, but why O has T rather than some 
alternative (or class of alternatives) T*.4 Because not all causes of T’s instantiation by O will be 
relevant in explaining why O has T rather than T*, it is possible in principle for past selection to 
explain why some organism exists without thereby explaining its traits. This, of course, does not 
show that selection is never relevant to the explanation of trait contrasts: this stronger result requires 
a further argument. 
 
To this end, Sober asks us to imagine a genealogy of uniparental organisms in which there is 
selection for a trait G against an alternative B (Figure 1). Sober accepts that natural selection for G 
 
4 For discussions of contrastive explanation in general, see Dretske 1973, van Fraassen 1980, Garfinkel 1983, Lewis 
1986, Sober 1994, Woodward 2003, Lipton 2004 and Strevens 2008. Strevens account will receive further attention in 
Section 4. 
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over B explains why organism 3 (henceforth: O3) has two offspring while organism 2 (O2) has none. 
He denies, however, that selection explains why organism 4 (O4) or organism 5 (O5) is G rather 
than B. Crucially, he denies this on the grounds that the following counterfactual is true:  
 
[I]ndividuals 4 and 5 would have had the traits they have even if 
organism 2 had not failed to reproduce … [and] even if organism 3 
had produced more than two offspring (Sober 1995, 387).  
 
 
Sober’s central claim, then, is that an alternative selective regime (say, selection for B over 
G) would have resulted in one of two possible outcomes: either (i) O4 and O5 would never have 
existed at all, or (ii) O4 and O5 would still have existed with the same traits they actually have. An 
alternative selective regime would never, by itself, have resulted in O4 or O5 being B. From this, 
Sober infers that the selective regime does not help explain why O4 and O5 are G rather than B. 
Focussing on the traits of O4, we can formulate Sober’s argument more precisely as follows: 
 
Figure 1: A genealogy of uniparental organisms (from Sober 1995). 
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S1.  Selection for G over B helps explain why O4 has G rather than 
B only if (if there had been selection for B over G, O4 would 
have possessed B rather than G). 
S2.  If there had been selection for B over G, O3 would have either 
failed to reproduce altogether or else would have produced 
offspring with the same traits as its actual offspring.  
S3.  (from S2) It is not true that, if there had been selection for B 
over G, O4 would have had B rather than G. 
S4.  (from S1, S3) Selection for G over B does not help explain why 
O4 has G rather than B. 
 
I do not intend to challenge the counterfactual embodied in premise S2. What I want to 
challenge is the principle—embodied in premise S1—that the truth of this counterfactual implies 
the explanatory irrelevance of selection. First, however, let us consider how Sober’s original 
argument has been modified in the light of subsequent developments.  
 
Sober’s original argument concerns one trait in one organism, and it is not obvious, on the 
face of it, that the same considerations will apply for all traits and all organisms. In particular, it is 
far from obvious that considerations which apply in the case of monogenic traits in haploid 
organisms will extend to polygenic traits or to the traits of diploid organisms (and organisms of 
other ploidies). Neander (1995) argues for an exception when traits are polygenic; Matthen (1999) 
argues for an exception when reproduction is sexual. In reply to Neander, Walsh (1998) defends of 
the applicability of the argument to polygenic traits; in reply to Matthen, Lewens (2001) argues that 
there is nothing special about sex. I will not recapitulate these arguments here. I will simply 
concede here that Sober’s argument, if sound, applies to polygenic traits and to organisms of all 
ploidies.  




As Pust (2001, 2004) notes, Sober’s original argument is invalid unless augmented with a 
further premise. S3 does not follow from S2 alone, because S2 leaves open the possibility that, 
under the alternative selective regime, O4 still exists as the offspring of a different parent. To be 
valid, Sober’s argument must be supplemented with the assumption that O4 is necessarily the 
offspring of its actual parent, O3. This assumption has been a focal point for subsequent criticism 
(see Pust 2001, 2004; Matthen 2002, 2003; Forber 2005). Nonetheless, to give Sober’s argument the 
best possible chance of success, I will concede this premise too.  
 
Putting the pieces together, the SWP argument, appropriately strengthened and generalized, 
runs as follows: 
 
S1.  Selection for G over B helps explain why O4 has G rather than 
B only if (if there had been selection for B over G, O4 would 
have possessed B rather than G). 
P1.  O4 is necessarily the offspring of O3. 
S2.  If there had been selection for B over G, O3 would have either 
failed to reproduce altogether or else would have produced 
offspring with the same traits as its actual offspring.  
S3.  (from P1, S2) It is not true that, if there had been selection for 
B over G, O4 would have had B rather than G. 
S4.  (from S1, S2) Selection for G over B does not help explain why 
O4 has G rather than B. 
W1.  The same considerations apply, mutatis mutandis, for all trait 
contrasts, regardless of the complexity of the traits in question 
or the inheritance system of the organism in question. 
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Conclusion: (from S4, W1) Selection for traits does not explain the 
traits of individuals. 
 
To reiterate, I grant P1 and W1 for the sake of argument. For I contend that the protracted disputes 
over the legitimacy of these premises have led to the main players in the debate overlooking a 
central but separate issue: regardless of the status of the other premises, the argument remains of 
doubtful soundness by virtue of its reliance on the proto-theory of contrastive explanation embodied 
in S1. I want to argue that, on closer examination, this proto-theory turns out to be highly 
questionable. 
 
3. Contrastive Explanation in Focus  
As a preliminary remark, let me emphasize that, in attacking S1, I am not attacking a straw man: a 
reliance on an S1-type premise is not a dispensable feature of Sober’s presentation. On the contrary, 
S1 (or else a very similar principle) is explicitly assumed by all recent defenders of the negative 
view. For Walsh (1998), to ascertain whether natural selection can explain the traits of individuals, 
we must ask “would altering just the selective regime alter [an individual’s] genotype?” (1998, 
257). Walsh argues that, since it would not, the selective regime is irrelevant. For Pust (2004), the 
claim that natural selection explains why an individual possesses some trait “presupposes … that 
some appropriate change in the selective regime would have resulted in the same individual’s 
having a different trait” (2004, 766). Ulrich Stegmann (2010a) considers an organism x which 
possesses some trait A rather than an alternative trait B. He concedes, as Sober does, that natural 
selection helps explain why x’s mother survived to reproductive age, but asks, “is it true that if the 
mother had died before reaching reproductive age, then x would have B instead of A?” (2010, 65). 
Because this counterfactual is false, he argues, the selective regime is irrelevant in explaining the 
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contrast (see Nanay 2010 and Stegmann 2010b for further discussion of this pivotal counterfactual). 
The centrality of S1 to the SWP argument is evident in all these cases. 
To see why S1 is dubious, consider a more general claim of which it is a special case, the 
“simple counterfactual criterion” (SCC) for explanatory relevance: 
 
SCC: C rather than C* helps explain E rather than E* only if: (if C* 
had occurred, then E* would have occurred). 
 
Counterexamples to SCC arise whenever the non-occurrence of E* is guaranteed by more than one 
causal factor. Suppose I want to get to London to Paris, but my arrival is blocked by two 
independent factors: there are leaves on the line in London and the train drivers are on strike in 
Paris. The causal explanation of why I end up stuck in London, rather than successfully reaching 
Paris, will make reference to these factors, yet both will fail to satisfy SCC. For if the train drivers 
had been working, rather than striking, I would not have reached Paris, owing to the continuing 
presence of leaves on the line. And if the leaves had been cleared promptly rather than being left to 
pile up, I would not have reached Paris, owing to the continuing drivers’ strike. Both factors fail to 
satisfy SCC because the non-occurrence of E* is overdetermined. In such cases, SCC is overly 
stringent: when we want to explain E rather than E*, causes can fail to satisfy SCC yet gain 
explanatory relevance via their role in helping to ensure the non-occurrence of E*.   
 
 This consideration suggests that the application of SCC in biological contexts might lead to 
errors if it is possible for the non-instantiation of a particular trait by a particular individual (e.g, the 
non-instantiation of B by O4) to be overdetermined in the same way that my non-arrival in Paris was 
overdetermined. In fact, such scenarios are not merely possible: they are biologically commonplace.  
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Suppose, for instance, that we want to know why an individual moth, M, has dark rather 
than pale colouration. After investigating, we find that colouration is inherited, and that M’s parents 
both possessed the dark allele rather than the pale allele. Any reasonable criterion should allow for 
the obvious explanatory relevance of parental genotype to offspring phenotype. Suppose, however, 
that there was extremely strong selection against pale colouration, such that, if M’s parents had 
possessed the pale allele, they would never have survived to reproductive age. As a result, it is false 
that, if M’s parents had possessed the pale allele, M would have possessed pale colouration. Not-E* 
(i.e., the non-instantiation of pale colouration by the offspring moth) is overdetermined by two 
independent factors (namely, the parental genotype, and the strong selection against the pale allele) 
in exactly the same way that my non-arrival in Paris was overdetermined by two independent 
factors. The information that M’s parents possessed the dark allele rather than the pale allele 
consequently fails to satisfy SCC. Hence, either SCC is defective in this context, or parental alleles 
are genuinely irrelevant to the explanation of offspring traits. The latter possibility seems 
sufficiently absurd to warrant a preference for the former.  
 
If SCC is defective here, however, it will be defective in many other biological contexts too. 
For it will be defective whenever not-E* (i.e., the non-instantiation of the contrast trait) is 
overdetermined by two independent factors. Not-E* will be overdetermined in this fashion 
whenever (i) the actual trait in question was inherited by the organism from its parents, and (ii) 
there was strong selection against the non-instantiated contrast trait, such that, if the organism’s 
parents had possessed the alternative allele, the organism would never have existed at all. Whenever 
these conditions are satisfied, SCC will entail, absurdly, that parental genotypes are irrelevant to the 
explanation of offspring phenotypes. Of course, it will also entail that natural selection is irrelevant 
to the explanation of offspring phenotypes. Indeed, as the SWP argument points out, natural 
selection will in general fail to satisfy SCC. At this point, however, I think we might legitimately 
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start to wonder whether this result is owed more to the defectiveness of SCC than to the genuine 
irrelevance of natural selection. 
  
4. A better relevance criterion 
The SWP argument relies on an assumption regarding the nature of contrastive explanation that has 
evaded scrutiny in the ensuing debate. I have argued that this assumption (namely, that contrastive-
explanatory relevance can be captured by a simple counterfactual criterion) is extremely dubious: 
SCC is defective in many biological cases. This is a reason to doubt the soundness of the SWP 
argument, but it is not in itself a vindication of the positive view. To defend the positive view, we 
need to find a better criterion for explanatory relevance, and we need to show that it does allow for 
the relevance of selection to the explanation of individual phenotypes. 
To find such a criterion, we can turn to a recent account of contrastive causal explanation 
that succeeds where SCC fails: that of Strevens (2008, ch. 5). Strevens articulates his account in the 
form of the following four-step procedure: 
Your task is to explain why e rather than f occurred, or for short, e-not-
f. You proceed by constructing separate causal explanatory models for 
e and f that satisfy the following conditions: 
1. The model for e is veridical; it is a (noncontrastive) standalone 
explanation for why e occurred. 
2. The model for f is veridical except for one or more states of affairs 
that you might call the switching events. The model falsely 
represents the switching events as not having occurred. 
3. Each of the switching events appears in the model for e. They are 
therefore difference-makers for e. 
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4. The model for f is in some sense the most plausible story as to how 
f might have occurred. (Perhaps it is the model instantiated in the 
closest possible worlds in which f occurs). (Strevens 2008, 175) 
Strevens’s procedure for explaining E rather than E* differs markedly from the simple procedure 
suggested by SCC. SCC instructs to consider whether, if a cause-variable were tweaked, E* would 
have ensued: if it would not have done, SCC condemns the cause-variable to explanatory 
irrelevance. As we have seen, this procedure is far too stringent: following it rigidly would lead us 
to miss straightforwardly relevant causes. Strevens’s procedure is virtually a mirror image: first we 
construct a plausible scenario in which E* ensues, then we look for differences between the actual 
and counterfactual courses of events. We look, in particular, for the “switching events” needed to 
turn the former into the latter. Streven’s procedure copes far better than SCC when not-E* is 
guaranteed by multiple factors. The most plausible counterfactual scenario in which I successfully 
travel to Edinburgh is one in which the weather is permissive and the train drivers compliant. The 
“switching events”, the events one would have to change to turn the actual course of events into the 
contrasting scenario, are the snowfall and the strike. In this case, Strevens’s procedure delivers the 
intuitively correct results. 
 We can apply Streven’s procedure to show how a selective regime can be relevant in 
explaining the traits of individuals. Consider a population of haploid, asexually reproducing 
organisms. Let us focus on two loci and four genotypes: <A, B>, <A, b>, <a, B> and <a, b>.   The 
first generation in the model contains one individual, O1, of type <A, B>.  





The actual course of events is represented by Figure 2. In actuality, <A, B> is fitter than <A, 
b> and <a, B>. The actual outcome of the process is unsurprising: new genotypes appearing in the 
population are selected against; and, three generations later, everyone is still <A, B>. Now consider 
one individual in this generation, O6, and a particular contrastive explanandum: why does O6 
possess <A, B> rather than <a, b>?  
To apply Strevens’s procedure, we consider the most plausible model of how O6 might have 
ended up with <a, b>. This is, of course, a model in which the relevant mutations do appear in O6’s 
lineage. But it is also a model in which the selection pressures are different; for, had they been the 
same, the mutations would not have been passed down to O6 (indeed, O6 would never have existed). 
There are therefore multiple switching events: mutations which in fact failed to occur would have 
needed to occur, and selection pressures which actually obtained would have needed to be different 
(Figure 3).  
Figure 2: model in which O6 inherits <A,B> 





This case demonstrates that, if Strevens’s model of contrastive causal explanation is on the 
right lines, there is at least one scenario in which natural selection is relevant in explaining the traits 
of individuals. But how widely will such considerations apply? In broad terms, we can see that they 
will apply for any contrast T-rather-than-T* such that any plausible model for the possession of T* 
by the individual concerned involves a change to the actual selective regime.  Such a situation will 
typically arise because: (i) T is prevalent in the actual population, (ii) the intermediaries between T 
and T* would be strongly selected against under the current selective regime, and (iii) T* could not 
plausibly have appeared without such intermediaries. It is not difficult to come up with contrasts 
that meet this relevance criterion: one simply has to think of contrasting traits that are likely to be 
separated from an actual trait by a deep valley of unfit intermediaries. If we ask, for instance, why a 
particular insect resembles a stick rather than a leaf, why a particular fish has gills rather than lungs, 
or why a particular bat has fur rather than feathers, then selection for those traits—and selection 
against any mutations in the direction of the contrasting alternative—will qualify as switching 
events. Strevens’s relevance criterion vindicates the positive view in such contexts. 
There is a particular kind of trait contrast for which these considerations seem especially 
salient: that of being adapted to a particular environment E rather than to an alternative environment 
E*. When we ask why some particular organism is adapted to E rather than E*, it seems highly 
Figure 3: model in which O6 inherits <a,b> 
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likely that any plausible model for the contrasting outcome will involve a change to the selective 
regime. This is because, more or less by definition, E will select against any mutation that makes an 
organism less adapted to E. Hence, unless the selective regime imposed by E is exceptionally weak 
or E and E* are exceptionally similar in their demands, the selective forces will need to be different 
in the contrast model for adaptedness to E*. This gives us reason to suspect that Strevens’s 
procedure vindicates the positive view precisely where we need it most: in the explanation of an 
individual’s adaptedness to its particular environment. 
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